The empirical findings of this study are consistent with theoretical predictions and suggest that tax effects differ, depending on the investment regime. The endogeneity of the regime choice -direct versus indirect -is taken into account by a switching regression approach.
Introduction
Economists agree that corporate taxation influences both the location choice and the investment decision of multinational firms (see Gresik, 2001; De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003) .
However, as companies become ever more international, another aspect is that multinational enterprises also find it increasingly easier to shift profits from high-to low-tax jurisdictions (see Hines, 1999; Devereux and Maffini, 2007) . Differences in national tax systems and the complexity of the international tax law open up additional opportunities to avoid taxes. This implies that multinationals may establish sophisticated firm structures to exploit tax-avoidance opportunities.
In this paper we analyze how taxes affect the affiliate-level investment decision of German multinationals, taking into account that a significant share of outbound investments are indirect rather than direct. While we consider direct investments as simple bilateral structures, where a parent company is directly investing in a foreign affiliate; indirect strategies involve at least three corporate entities, where the parent is investing via an intermediate or conduit entity in another foreign enterprise (see Weichenrieder and Mintz, 2008) .
Indirect investment structures possibly support multinationals in reducing corporate tax liabilities on a worldwide basis, because profits can be shifted from high-to low-tax (or even zero-tax) conduit locations. Moreover, tax-efficient indirect financing structures allow payments to be channeled from affiliates to parent companies, possibly without any tax deduction. As a consequence, the role of corporate taxation in destination countries may change. Mintz (2004) demonstrates in a theoretical model that the analysis of investment decisions made by multinationals should explicitly differ between direct and indirect investments. In contrast to the existing empirical literature, this paper follows this structural distinction and empirically confirms that tax effects differ: while direct investments are negatively affected by foreign statutory tax rates, indirect investments are positively related to statutory tax rates in host countries. If we follow theoretical predictions and control for the tax-related cost of capital, we find adverse effects on affiliate-level investment for both structures. The potential endogeneity of the structural choice (direct versus indirect) is taken into account by a switching regression approach. The empirical investigation is based on the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi), a comprehensive dataset of all German outbound investment positions provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (the German Central Bank; see Lipponer, 2007) . The current version is available from 1996 to 2005 and contains data on companies' balance sheets as well as some further information, e.g. whether the investment is held directly or indirectly.
The novel empirical findings of this paper carry an important policy implication: the existence of conduit entities and low-tax conduit countries will lead to less aggressive international tax competition over statutory tax rates. Conversely, if tax discrimination in terms of preferential tax treatment for the conduit entities is reduced, tax competition is intensified (see Keen, 2001; Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2007) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general overview of direct and indirect investment structures, including some descriptive statistics. In Section 3, we set up a model that distinguishes between direct and indirect investments. Section 4 proposes an empirical estimation approach. Subsequently, Section 5 provides information about the data. Section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 examines the sensitivity of the results. Section 8 concludes.
Direct versus Indirect Investments
While the majority of foreign investments are direct, a considerable proportion of multinational outbound activities are indirect (see below). Figure 1 shows a stylized model which points out that German multinationals can, in principle, follow both investment regimes. Either the multinational decides to invest directly in the destination country F or it chooses an indirect structure and establishes a conduit entity, possibly in a third country C.
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The choice of this organizational structure is presumably not random; it may depend on destination-country characteristics, firm preferences or strategies, as well as on the company-specific potential. There has been a significant increase in the number of investment objects in both regimes.
Moreover, focusing on indirect observations, the left graph of Figure 3 shows the three most important conduit locations for German multinationals. The Netherlands attract more than a fourth of German conduit entities. Together with Switzerland and Austria, these three countries host almost 60% of all German conduit entities. The right-hand side of Figure 3 displays the three most important destination countries for indirect structures.
Here, observations are more evenly distributed across countries: about one-fifth of German indirect outbound investment goes to Italy, France, and Spain.
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While this paper argues that differences in international taxation can explain why indirect structures exist, the classical case of an indirect entity may be associated with non-tax reasons. Indeed, headquarters or holding companies may provide services which it is useful to bundle centrally for legal or efficiency reasons. With regard to taxation, Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008) identify three potential roles of conduit entities. First, a conduit entity can be used for so-called treaty shopping, because some countries do offer preferential treatment with respect to withholding taxes.
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Second, conduit entities in low-tax countries provide high-tax affiliates with internal debt. Borrowing from affiliates located in low-tax conduit countries and lending to affiliates in high-tax host countries will allow the latter .
× × Indirect Investments
Annual number of (in)direct outbound investments (1996 -2005) . The figure reflects the number of affiliates in host countries. Direct is defined as direct participation interest in non-holding companies. Indirect as participation interest held by holding and non-holding companies. All minority holdings, partnerships, and observations from the financial service sector are excluded. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, MiDi. Indirect three-country structures are the only structures considered, i.e. conduit countries are always different from host countries. The left panel shows the three most important conduit countries for German indirect outbound investments (1996 -2005) . The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria account for 56.76% of all observations. The right side depicts the three most important destination countries for indirect investments (1996 -2005) . Italy, France, and Spain account for 21.58% of all observations. Minority holdings, partnerships, and financial services are excluded. Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, MiDi.
to deduct interest payments from profits and save taxes. Under certain conditions, for example if the parent is also located in a high-tax country, this structure even allows for two interest deductions for one investment.
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Finally, the low-tax conduit can reinvest income and defer any payments to the parent. This last point is especially relevant for outbound investments from countries using a tax credit system. However, income deferral of passive income may collide with controlled foreign company (CFC) rules, depending on the type of income (for further information about the US Subpart F legislation, see Hines, 1999 ; for the German rule, see Weichenrieder, 1996) . Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003) confirm that tax deferral is an important strategy for US multinationals, because of the US tax system.
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They show that indirectly owned affiliates are more sensitive to foreign tax-rate differences, because chains of ownership can mitigate the effects of the US foreign tax credit system by expanding opportunities to defer US tax liabilities. Incentives under ownership chains are then comparable to incentives under exemption systems, because multinationals can avoid repatriation taxes. Note, though, that implications of using ownership chains are basically very different, depending on the tax system of the parent country.
Theoretical Analysis
Consider a simple partial equilibrium model of a German multinational enterprise. The multinational is active in Germany G and also in a foreign country F . Production is determined by a concave production function with standard properties, where f G (K G ) denotes production in Germany, and f F (K F ) denotes production in the foreign country.
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The model follows the analysis of Mintz (2004) and distinguishes two regimes, where Regime I (II) is the direct (indirect) investment regime.
Direct Structure (Regime I)
Profits are determined by output, f G (K G ) and f F (K F ). Both countries, Germany and the foreign country, tax profits at rates of τ G and τ F , respectively. We assume an interest rate i, which is identical for all types of borrowing and in both countries. We further assume that foreign-source income is tax exempt.
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Overall profits of the multinational (home and foreign profits) are given by
The first line captures the profits of the German parent company. B G refers to external debt finance. Accordingly, interest expenses iB G are deductible from the tax base. Note that we abstract from opportunity costs for own capital iE G . We may, however, define profits inclusive of iE G . The second line refers to the profits of the foreign affiliate. The affiliate in F can borrow from third-party lenders B F or finance with parent equity E F .
The parent receives dividends iE F without tax deduction. We keep E F in the modelalbeit it would cancel out in this first case -because it emphasizes one crucial difference compared to the indirect structure (see below). The firm maximizes profits subject to the following constraints:
Note that the first constraint implies that the parent also raises funds to finance the foreign affiliate; actually more than necessary for its own investment K G . We further impose nonnegativity constraints on B G and B F . An additional assumption is that the host country tax rate is always lower than the home country tax rate (τ G > τ F ). If we maximize the model with respect to K G and K F , taking into account all relevant restrictions, we obtain the following marginal conditions:
The first optimality condition points out that the decision of the parent company is not distorted by corporate taxation. Abstracting from i, we refer to the second expression as the tax wedge 8 or the tax-related cost of capital of the foreign affiliate. If we assume that the German tax rate always exceeds the foreign tax rate, new investment is exclusively parentdebt financed.
9
The equity transfer to the affiliate, therefore, is refinanced with external debt. Assuming that the parent's profits are positive (the parent is not tax-exhaust), overall profits of the multinational enterprise are maximized. While the optimality condition for the German part of the multinational implies tax neutrality, the required rate of return for the foreign investment is below i, because of simple tax arbitrage.
For a variation in the foreign statutory tax rate, we obtain the comparative static effect which is unambiguously negative: a higher foreign tax rate τ F implies higher cost of capital and less investment
Indirect Structure (Regime II)
We rely on one structural difference when introducing the conduit structure: the parent company still transfers equity funds to a foreign affiliate, but now to a conduit entity.
Subsequently, the conduit provides the foreign affiliate F with internal debt, for which interest expenses are tax deductible. The meaning of the above notation slightly changes:
E F now refers to internal debt if we consider the foreign affiliate; it refers to equity if we consider the parent firm. Any further activity of the conduit is not modeled, because we are only interested in investment activities of the affiliate in F . The multinational's profits are determined by
We assume that transfers, including interest payments to the conduit, can be channeled from the affiliate to the parent without any tax deduction. The model then describes the so-called double-dip structure, because the multinational can deduct interest payments in the host country and in the home country.
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We maximize the model subject to the above constraints and obtain two expressions for the cost of capital:
The foreign affiliate's capital costs are further reduced, because of the additional interest deduction. A variation in the foreign tax rate yields the following positive expression
The prediction of a positive tax effect is the result of the double-dip interest deduction, because a higher foreign tax rate implies that interest deductions are even more valuable.
10 Intuitively, the German parent takes up more capital than necessary to finance its own investment. Interest expenses in Germany are deductible for corporate tax purposes. The foreign affiliate is internal debt financed, and associated interest expenses are again deductible. Hence we have two interest deductions for the same investment.
Indirect Structure (Extended)
We extend the indirect model with respect to one critical assumption. While Equation (2) implies that interest payments received by the conduit are tax exempt, we introduce a tax τ C on interest payments to the conduit. Profits can then be written as
τ C may denote withholding taxes as well as the conduit country tax rate. The marginal decision of the foreign affiliate is then determined by
There is no longer any tax advantage compared to the direct structure if τ F equals τ C . If τ C < τ F , the tax wedge ranges somewhere between the direct and the indirect solution.
To sum up, theory suggests two different regimes with two (three) different measures for the tax-related cost of capital. Hence, tax wedges T for respective regimes follow:
T 1 applies to the direct structure (Regime I); T 2 is the relevant tax measure for the indirect structure (Regime II); and T * 2 relates to the extended indirect structure where τ C is also considered.
Investigation Approach
The purpose of the empirical investigation is to estimate how taxes affect affiliate-level investment. The theoretical analysis suggests two different regimes, depending on whether investments are direct or indirect. One way to approach this problem is to consider direct and indirect investments as two separate samples, simply split observations, and estimate two distinct equations. However, firms do not randomly choose one or the other regime, and a simple split does not fully account for this endogeneity.
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To address the endogeneity problem we follow the literature and estimate an endogenous switching regression model, where the switching rule is observed. (Lee, 1978) suggests a two-step procedure: first, estimate the binary variable R indicating whether the investment is directly or indirectly held. Subsequently, estimate affiliate investment in a second stage and condition on the regime choice.
11 We can think of endogeneity in this context in many different ways. First, there are some firms switching from one regime to the other. The ultimate regression sample contains exactly 50 affiliates switching at least once over the whole time span. Second, firms' potentials to cushion shocks differ, depending on the regime. Hence, the regime is correlated with these shocks. Third, the variable of interest, affiliate-level investment, may also differ structurally with respect to all control variables. Fourth, regime choice and investment level may be simultaneously determined. Another intuitive way to think about endogeneity is to look at the decision to establish an indirect structure. The existence of preferential tax treatments, or generally differences in international taxation, presumably distort the decision to establish a conduit structure. Furthermore, if the heterogeneity in multinationals' potentials determines the regime, we have a problem of self selection, or selection into the regime. Note that any fixed-effects approach may account for time-invariant preferences (e.g., Vella, 1998 ). Yet the proclivity of multinationals to choose a specific regime can vary over time.
From a taxation perspective, conduit structures should generally be dominant, empirically.
However, descriptive statistics show that the majority of investments are direct. The reason may be that indirect structures are also costly: while every foreign activity is associated with costs (e.g., Markusen, 1995) , a conduit entity involves additional control and information problems, and hence, additional costs which reduce the probability to choose the indirect structure. We summarize the decision to establish a conduit entity (the first-stage decision) with the following equations
otherwise.
R ijkt is a binary variable indicating whether the multinational j is investing in country k at time t in an affiliate i via a conduit entity or not. IN D ijkt is the corresponding unobserved propensity and c ijkt represents the company-specific costs associated with the conduit firm. These costs are determined by affiliate and company-group variables and also by host-location factors such as the host country tax rate τ kt . Hence, a vector X ijkt of observable host-country characteristics as well as affiliate-and company-group-specific characteristics determine costs. Finally, γ i captures unobserved preferences of affiliates, which may be important, for instance, because of affiliate-specific management strategies.
First-step estimation equations are then specified as
The respective regime choice is identified by the company-group-specific variables BST jt and P RO jt , which may reflect the group-specific ability as regards establishing a conduit entity. BST jt is the balance-sheet total of the multinational group; P RO jt refers to the profitability of the multinational.
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Moreover, all relevant second-stage explanatory variables are included. From first-stage regressions we obtain estimates for an additional selection termλ. Includingλ in the equations of interest allows us to consistently estimate Regime I:
Regime II:
Y denotes affiliate-level investment. X ijkt is a vector of affiliate-and country-specific control variables; ψ t are time, ϕ i affiliate-specific effects. To control for selection, we include estimated selection terms,
, as additional regressors (see Maddala, 1983) .
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Finally, T 1 and T 2 are the tax-related cost of capital for direct and indirect structures as defined in Equations (4) and (5), respectively.
The empirical implementation of this two-step approach in context of panel data and 12 For further data and variable definitions see Section 5 and Appendix B. Note that empirical identification requires at least one variable that explains the regime choice. We may refer to this variable as an instrument. The nonlinearity of the probability model can already be sufficient to identify the regime. Yet this can cause collinearity among regressors since we condition on the regime choice in the second stage (Wooldridge, 2002) . Note also that we do not aim to explain which countries are preferable conduit-entity locations. Rather, we are interested in the multinational's regime choice, i.e. the first-stage decision to establish a conduit structure at all, where the company can choose any potential conduit location. unobserved heterogeneity in both equations requires further considerations. We follow the procedure suggested by Wooldridge (1995) for panel data selection models.
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Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data for the empirical analysis are taken from the Microdatabase Direct Investment Below regressions analyze the determinants of affiliate-level investment. Investment is defined as the logarithmic difference in the balance-sheet item 'fixed assets'.
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We can interpret this variable as a growth rate, but we mostly refer to 'investment' in the following.
One explanatory variable is the tax wedge T as defined above. This variable is expected to be negatively related to affiliate-level investment (see Section 3). In order to control for country characteristics, we employ various host country variables: GDP to capture market size, labor cost in manufacturing and the local lending rate to capture differences in factor prices.
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Furthermore, we control for the present value of depreciation allowances defined by the countries' tax code. Besides, we condition on the affiliate-specific variables sales and loss carry-forward. We expect a positive sign for sales, because this is an indicator for the affiliate's size and cash flow. The dummy variable loss carry-forward indicates whether some loss carry-forward is reported. The existence of losses in the previous periods may capture characteristics of the current decision problem of the company such as the expected performance of an affiliate. This variable is expected to be negatively related to investment. Table 1 summarizes all relevant regression variables and respective mean values. The estimation sample is restricted to majority holdings. Moreover, financial services, partnerships, and non-manufacturing observations are excluded (see Table 7 in the Appendix for a detailed classification). According to theory, we remove observations if the German tax rate is below the statutory tax rate of the destination country.
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Tax wedges are defined according to Equations (4), (5), and (6). Since withholding taxes are often negotiated in double tax treaties, the withholding tax rate τ C depends on the location of the conduit entity and potential treaties of host countries with conduit countries. To check the sensitivity of the analysis, we further define T * 2a , T * 2b , and T * 2c , where we set τ C at 10%, 20%, and 25%, respectively, for all observations (see also Section 7). The consideration for this is that we change the composition of the sample, because the maximization problem in Section 3.3 requires that τ C is below the host country tax rate. If this condition is not fulfilled, the 17 MiDi does not provide information on affiliate-specific labor costs, or interest payments, etc.
18 The relevant German statutory tax rate is adjusted for the non-deductibility of interest expenses, because this is the relevant measure for the basic arbitrage condition. Indicators (2006) . Hourly labor costs in U.S. dollars for production workers in manufacturing are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Eurostat. T 1 and T 2 refer to Equations (4) and (5). T * 2 refers to (6), where τ C corresponds to the relevant withholding tax rate for interest payments. Note that withholding tax data refers to the year 2005. τ C is equal to 10% (T * 2a ), 20% (T * 2b ), and 25% (T * 2c ) for all observations. Different sample size: (b) 5,554 observations, (c) 5,030 observations. observation is removed. Additionally, we change the variation of the nonlinear tax wedge.
Whereas tax wedges differ by construction, a comparison of other variables' mean values already indicate structural differences. As we would expect, the mean statutory tax rate is higher in Regime II. Market size, reflected by GDP, is on average twice as high in Regime II. Moreover, investments are much bigger in the case of the indirect structures -in terms of fixed assets and also in terms of sales. Finally, one may speculate whether the difference in average labor cost reflects the motivation for the foreign investments (vertical FDI versus horizontal FDI). Table 2 reports regression results where we simply split the sample and estimate the respective regime. As expected, we find a negative impact of the statutory tax rate and of the tax wedge T 1 on direct investments. While we partially confirm theory by finding a positive, but not significant, tax rate effect on indirect investments, in Column (4) we confirm the negative effect of the tax wedge as defined in Equation (5). Additional control variables such as the affiliate-specific sales, or the dummy variable for the loss carry-forward are included in all specifications. Both affiliate-specific variables show the expected sign. The fixed effects approach removes all cross-section variation between affiliates and also nests country fixed effects. In this sense, it is not surprising that country-specific variables, for example GDP or labor cost, are statistically insignificant. We find, however, a significant positive effect of the local lending rate for some specifications. The positive coefficient may reflect the comparative advantage of multinationals compared to domestic firms, because multinationals can rely on internal capital markets. Note that all regressions control for variations in German lending conditions by including a full set of time dummies. Thereby, we also capture general taxing conditions in Germany which are the same for all German parent firms.
Regression Analysis
Since we condition on affiliate-specific effects in this sample split, estimates are consistent if sample selection -the choice of the regime -depends on the constant affiliate-specific component (e.g., Vella, 1998) . If this affiliate-specific effect does not fully capture selection, i.e. if the selection effect varies over time, our estimates are not consistent. Table 3 presents the results from switching regressions, where we additionally condition on the selection effectλ.
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Basically, the results confirm findings in Table 2 . However, the positive tax rate effect for the indirect investments is now significant. The estimated coefficient for the tax wedge T 1 in Column (3) implies that a 1 percentage point higher tax wedge is associated with -.38% less new investment in fixed assets. The regression in Column (4) suggests that a 1 percentage point higher indirect tax wedge is associated with -.99% less investment. The results confirm the double-dip structure as modeled in Section 3.2, because T 2 is calculated accordingly. In a further step, we consider that host countries possibly impose withholding taxes. T * 2 now refers to Equation (6), where τ C corresponds to the bilateral withholding tax for interest payments between the host country and the conduit country. The insignificant coefficient in Column (5) may indicate that multinationals can avoid withholding taxes, for example, by using sophisticated conduit chains, or by benefiting from favorable tax treatment. Dependent variable is investment, defined as the logarithmic difference in the balancesheet position fixed assets (ln(fixed assets t ) -ln(fixed assets t−1 )). Time and affiliatelevel fixed effects are included but not reported. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust and clustered (year-country cell). (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. T 1 is defined according to Equation (4). T 2 follows (5). T * Dependent variable is investment, defined as the logarithmic difference in the balancesheet position fixed assets (ln(fixed assets t ) -ln(fixed assets t−1 )). Time dummies and linearized affiliate-level fixed effects are included but not reported. All estimations take into account the endogeneity of the regime choice. Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust for any form of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, and account for the twostep estimation (see Wooldridge, 1995) . (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. All reported results refer to Specification (2) of the probit equation (see Appendix B, Table 6 ). T 1 is defined according to Equation (4). T 2 follows (5). T * Table 4 summarizes the estimated selection effects (specifications refer to Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 ). A test on the joint significance of the 9 selection terms confirms a bias for both samples. Selection can basically depend on the general economic environment, for example cyclical fluctuations, and how multinationals are able to cope with it. Note, though, that we do not have any well-defined expectations about the sign of the selection variables. However, we estimate a significant positive effect for most years of the direct sample. This is, intuitively, what we would expect: a higher probability to invest directly implies less new investment (the selection term can be interpreted as the inverse probability to choose the direct regime). Yet the findings for the indirect sample are ambiguous. Table 6 ). Coefficients refer to Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 3 . Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust for any form of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, and account for the two-step estimation (see Wooldridge, 1995) . (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level.
Sensitivity Analysis
Eventually, we test the robustness of the regression analysis. Table 5 presents estimations for both regimes. Columns (1) and (4) refer to 27 European Union (EU) member countries.
Columns (2) and (5) Table 5 . In a next step, we only analyze affiliates from the manufacturing sector (Columns (3) and (6)). Findings are also robust with respect to this sample restriction. Finally, Columns (7), (8), and (9) employ tax wedges, where the tax rate τ C equals 10%, 20%, and 25%, for all observations. This changes the variation of the nonlinear tax term, and imposes a further restriction on the sample. Accordingly, all observations are removed if the host tax rate is above 10%, 20%, or 25% (the maximization problem in Section 3.3 requires that the host country tax rate is higher than taxation in the conduit country). All findings confirm the negative tax wedge effect, but the last specification is no longer significant. are robust for any form of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, and account for the two-step estimation (see Wooldridge, 1995) . (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. All reported results refer to Specification (2) of the probit equation (see Appendix B, Table 6 ). T 1 is defined according to Equation (4). T 2 follows (5). T * 2a corresponds to (6), where τ C corresponds to 10% for all observations. T * 2b assumes τ C = 20%, T * 2c assumes τ C = 25% for all observations.
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the affiliate-level investment decision of German multinationals. A theoretical model yields different corporate tax effects, depending on whether the multinational follows a direct or an indirect investment strategy. Accordingly, we estimate a switching regression model with observed switching for two structurally different regimes. This approach allows us to control for the endogeneity of the regime choice. The empirical results confirm theoretical predictions: corporate tax effects are negative for direct investments, but positive for indirect observations. The tax-related cost of capital is confirmed to be negatively related to investment in both regimes. In particular, according to Specifications (3) and (4) of Table 3 , we find a semi-elasticity of -.38 for direct and -.99
for indirect investments.
The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that income can be transferred to the German parent without any tax deduction. This may be reasonable, given that many conditions promoting the double-dip structure are fulfilled. First, Germany is a high-tax country.
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Second, Germany exempts dividend income almost completely. Third, the major conduit countries (see Section 2) are well-known conduit locations, often with preferential tax regimes.
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Fourth, real conduit structures can be more complicated. Indeed, indirect structures often involve not only one conduit entity, but complex multi-country ownership chains (Weichenrieder and Mintz, 2008) . This may open up more opportunities to avoid taxes.
20 If Germany is not the high-tax country, the observation is removed in Sections 6 and 7.
21 Special tax regimes often apply to holding companies (e.g., in Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, UK; see, e.g., Council of the European Union, 1999).
One remarkable aspect of the findings is the implication for tax competition: the existence of conduit structures and low-tax conduit countries reduces the downward pressure on statutory tax rates. One may speculate whether this explains why some countries can stick to relatively high statutory tax rates. However, tax competition is a phenomenon which is not confined to one specific aspect. In fact, since national governments can use tax preferences as a strategic policy variable (see Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2008) , tax competition for conduit entities may well be intensified.
Appendix A: Selection Correction for Panel Data Models under Conditional Mean Independence Assumption Wooldridge (1995) suggests a flexible two-stage regression method to correct for sample selection bias in panel data models. We apply a similar estimation strategy on the above switching regression model, which allows us to perform robust statistical inference. Appendix A summarizes the main points of the estimator, with an emphasis on standard error correction. For details and consistency proofs, please consult the Wooldridge (1995) paper.
The estimator allows for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved effects (γ i , ϕ i ) and observable explanatory variables.
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Furthermore, the error distribution in the second-stage equation remains unspecified; the idiosyncratic errors can be arbitrarily serially dependent and can have any form of heterogeneity.
We proceed with a version of the above switching regression model, where we slightly 22 A significant part of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by unobserved heterogeneity between firms. This unobserved effect is likely to be correlated with other control variables. Hence, consistent coefficients require a fixed effects approach. change notations for simplicity and stick closer to Wooldridge (1995) . We start the analysis by first estimating a probit model P (R it = 1|x i ) = Φ(x i δ t ).
Equation (8) is estimated by standard probit techniques,
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however for each time period
t. Subsequently, we obtain estimates for the selection terms,λ 1,i = φ(x iδt )/Φ(x iδt ) and λ 2,i = φ(x iδt )/(1−Φ(x iδt )), which are then included as control variables in the second-stage regressions (Maddala, 1983) .
Regime I: y 1,it = θ 1ŵ1,it + u 1,it iff R = 1.
Regime II: y 2,it = θ 2ŵ2,it + u 2,it iff R = 0.
Here,ŵ is defined asŵ R,it = (1, x R,it , x i , 0, ..., 0,λ R,it , 0, ..., 0), for R = 1, 2.
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Note that we additionally include the estimated probability termsλ R (R = 1, 2) from first-stage regressions and also firm-specific means to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
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Subsequently, we obtain the coefficient vector θ R (R = 1, 2) from a pooled OLS regression:
R,itŷ R,it ), R = 1, 2.
23 (x) is a vector of control variables, including all second-stage regressors and additional regimeidentifying variables. 24 The index R still denotes the Regime, but no longer refers to the binary variable.
25 Following Wooldridge (1995) , we linearize the unobserved effects according to the Chamberlain (1980 Chamberlain ( , 1982 method, who suggests to include all leads and lags of explanatory variables in order to model the relationship between the unobserved effect and the exogenous variables. To save degrees of freedom, however, we apply the Mundlak (1978) approach that imposes time-constant coefficients and include mean values of explanatory variables (x i ).
Finally, we have to account for the two-stage estimation procedure. We obtain Avar(θ) by first defining OLS residuals,ê R,it ≡ y it −ŵ itθ for R it = 1, 2; i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T . To estimate Avar(θ), we further defineD:
R,itθ R G R,it for R = 1, 2, 
The matrix Z it is Z it = (0 0 ...0 v it x i 0 ...0 ) .v it is the derivative of λ(·) evaluated at x iδt .
For simplicity, we continue without the regime identifier R and estimate Avar(θ) for the respective regime. To obtain Avar(θ) asÂ
/N , we further definê
where ∇ δxit (δ) is the gradient ofx it (δ) , evaluated atδ;r it is defined for each t as minus the inverse of the average estimated Hessian times the estimated score of the probit loglikelihood function for observation i, where we use the standard results for the first-and second derivatives for the probit model (e.g., Maddala, 1983) . Finally, we estimate Avar(θ)
/N and obtain valid standard errors.
that, after conditioning on affiliate-specific heterogeneity, group-specific variables are the only relevant factors affecting the choice of the regime. Dependent variable is the binary indicator for direct/indirect (1/0) investment. Probit estimation including time-specific effects and linearized unobserved affiliate-specific effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses). (***) (**) (*) indicate significance at the (1%) (5%) (10%) level. Balance-sheet Total is the annual aggregate at group level. Profitability is the profitability of the multinational group, defined as total profits of the multinational (after taxes, prior to profit distribution, and offsetting of losses carried forward), relative to the balance-sheet total of the company group. 
